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Federal Budget Trends and the
1981 Reagan Economic Plan
N EARLY 1981, a newly inaugurated Ronald
Reagan announced an economic plan which in-
cluded goals of “an immediate, substantial, and
sustained reduction in the growth offederal ex-
penditur-es [and] a significant reduction in federal
tax rates 1 After two terms in office, it seems
time to examine the original Reagan budget plan
in light of the actual performance overthe 1980s.
Althoirgh the budget plan had far-reaching eco-
nomnic and social consequences, this an-tide fo-
cuses on the extent towhich the initial budget
projections were realized.z
First,the 1981 economic setting, which provided
the under-lying rationale for- the Reagan plan, is
summarized. Then, because the budget and eco-
nomic conditions an’e intern-elated, the 1981 eco-
nomic assumptions are examined in r-etrnspect.
This is followed by a comparison of planned and
realized changes in federal outlays and receipts.
The article concludes with an evaluation ofthe
1981 budget plan.
THE 1981 ECONOMIC FORECAST IN
RETROSPECT
When theReagan administration beganprepar-
ing its budget in late 1980 and ear-ly 1981, the U.S.
economy was recovering fl’omabrief recession in
the first halfof 1980. Output was growing slug-
gishly for arecovery phase of the business cycle,
unemployment was well above 7 percent of the
labor for-ce and productivity, as measun’ed by out-
put per hour, was declining. Prices generally were
increasing at double-digit rates and interest rates
reflected the high rate ofinflation. The federal
budget deficit forfiscal 1980 was $60 billion and
the outgoing administration’s estimate for 1981
was about $55 billion.
The incoming pr-esident described the situation
as “the most serious set ofeconomic problems
since the 1930s.”3The most important cause of
these problems, he suggested, was the gover-n-
ment itself: through taxes, spending, regulatory
policies and monetary policies, it had sacrificed
‘America’s New Beginning. ..(1981), pp. 1—3. Forfurther
details, see Office of Management and Budget (1981 a) and
Carlson (May and November 1981).
2For more extensive analyses ofthe Reagan years, see Boskin
(1987), Mills and Palmer (1984), Modigliani (1988) and
Niskanen (1988).
~America’s New Beginning ...(1981), p. 4.
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long-ter-m growth and price stability for ephemeral
short-term goals. To combat these problems, the
administration proposed a pn’ogram that was in-
tended to:
restore fiscal integrity; inrrease incc-ritives for
saving, investment, and production; attain mone-
tary and financial stability; and enhance therole of
the mar-ketplace as the principal forte in the allo-
cation of resources.
4
An important par-t of everybudget progn’am is
the set of under-lying economic assumptions?
Figure 1 shows the administration’s 1981 for-ecasts
for a variety of key economic variables alongwith
them’actual performance. As the top tier shows,
the administration oven-estimated the growth in
nominal GNP from 1980 to 1986 bya substantial
amount.’ In particular, it did not forecast the
1981—82 r’ecession nor did it foresee the sharp
reduction in nominal GNU growth after 1984. By
1986, the cunrulative er-r’or for GNU was over $800
billion, or’ almost 20 per-cent of the actual level of
GNP in 1986. This error reflected an actual GNP
growth r’ate of 7.8 percent over the 1980—86 period,
quite a hit lower than the assumed gr-owth rate of
11 percent:
The over-estimate of nominal GNU reflected over-
estimates of both real growth Isecond tier of figure
1) arid inflation third tier’of figun’e 11. The cumula-
tive error in forecasts of real GNU by 1986 was 7
percent while the GNU deflator was overestimated
by 11 percent. The 1981 administration forecast for
inflation for the 1980—86 period was a 7.1 per-cent
annual rate; the actual inflation r-ate during this
period was 5.1 percent.’
The fourth tier offigur’e I indicates that the un-
employment rate was underestimated in each of
the years from 1981 to 1986. The administration
forecast that the unemployment rate would rise in
1981, then fall to 5.6 percent by 1986; the actual
1986 rate was 7.1 percent.
Finally, as indicated in the bottom tier of figure
1, the Treasury bill rate was also underestimated.
The Reagan administration forecast a steady de-
cline in the Treasury bill rate from more than 11
percent in 1980 to 5.7 percent in 1986; the actual
rate rose sharply in 1981, before falling to 6.4 per-
cent in 1986.
These key economic variables generally moved
unfavorably dur-ing the 1980—86 period in terms of
their’ effect on the fedenal budget. The slower-
than-fon’ecast gr’owth of nominal GNU slowed the
gn-owth of receipts and contributed to a lar’ger
deficit. Although slower-than-expected inflation
helped to reduce the growth ofbudget outlays,
slower’ real GNU growth and higher-than-forecast
unemployment n’ates incr’eased outlays, par’ticu-
laniy for unemployment insurance. Meanwhile, the
higher-than-expected Tn-easuty hill rate also
boosted outlays, especiallywhen the government
was borrowing more than planned. Thus, most of
the err’or’s in the adniinistration’s for-ecast wer-e
ones that increased the deficit more than
projected?
THE BUDGET TOTALS:
REALIZATIONS VS. THE REAGAN
PLAN
Asfigure 1 indicated, the Reagan administra-
tion’s 1981 economic assumptions were errone-
ous. A related question is towhat extent were the
budget projections also erroneous? An obvious
measun’e of this par-ticular error- is the difference
between the planned and the actual surplus/
deficit. Figure 2 shows the size of this discn’epancy.
The Reagan plan projected asteady move toward
abalanced budget by 1986; the actual deficit for
1986 was $221 billion.’0 To better- understand why
the 1981 budget plan’s projections were in error-,
individual budget categories ar’e examined below.”
~lbid.,p. 9.
‘Althoughsuch assumptions are absolutelynecessary to prolect
outlays and receipts, economic conditionsthemselves are
influenced by congressional and legislative decisions that
affect the budget. This was the administration’s reasoning in
1981; its budgetprograms weredesigned to havea favorable
effect on the economy. In fact, its economic assumptions were
so optimistic, it felt compelled tosay:
Indeed they do representa dramatic departure from the
trends of recent years — but so do the proposed policies. In
fact, ifeach portion of this comprehensive economic pro-
gram is put in place—quickly and completely — the eco-
nomic environment could improve even more rapidly than
envisioned in these assumptions. [mid., p. 25.1
‘Generally, from this point on, all references to years are to
fiscal years, i.e., the I 2’month period endingSeptember 30.
~Sucha projection was not unusual in early1981. For example,
the CongressionalBudget Office projected a 1980—86 nominal
GNP growth rate in excess of 11 percent. See CBO (1981).
‘By comparison, the CBO proiecteda2.8 percent rateof real
GNP growth and an 8.5 percent rate of inflation.
‘For a statistical investigation ofbias in government economic
forecasts, see Belongia (1988).
“Throughout this article references to the “Reagan plan” are to
the spending programthat excluded what they called “unallo-
cated savings.” These were cuts in spending forwhich detail
was to be provided later.
“The results of an alternative analysis usinga small model of
budget determination appears in appendix A.
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One major objective of Reagan’s economic pro-
gram was to
reduce the rate atwhich government spending
increases...,‘t’hus, the badly needed etlor’t to
‘‘cut’’ the budget really refers to t-cductioris in the
arttotnnt of increase in spending requested from
oneyear to the next.”
The 1981 pn’ogr-am for reducing the growth of out-
lays was subject to some confusion, however, be-
cause a tar’get ceiling was set which included sub-
stantial “unallocated savings” that were to be
specified later. In the following discussion, these
unallocated savings ar-e ignon’ed.
Figur-e 3 shows the Reagan plan for real federal
outlays along with actual teal outlays. Total out-
lays in r-eal terms cleariy did not slow as much as
planned. From 1976 to 1980, the aver-age gn’owth
rate ofreal federal outlays was 3.5 per-cent. The
actual rate of incr’easefrom 1980 to 1988 was 2.9
percent, only slightly slower’ than fi-om 1976 to
1980 and well in excess of the 1.1 percent rate that
the administration had pr-ojected in 1981.
As figur’e 4 shows, another’ wayto summan’ize
budget tr-ends is to examine the tatio of outlays to
GNU. From 1955 to 1980, the r’atio oftotal outlays
to GNU rose, albeit irregularly.” Although the
Reagan plan intended to reverse this tr-end sharply
after 1981, this did not’occtnr.”
2,4merioa’s New Beginning. (1981), p. 10.
“This irregularmovement reflects, amongother factors, the
business cycle as it affects both GNP and total outlays.
“Thediscrepancy in the 1980 ratio between the Reagan plan
and the realized outcome reflects the upward revisions of GNP
















Another key pam’t of the 1981 economic program
was a set oftax proposals that was intended “to
improve the after-tax, after-inflation n’ewar’dsto
wor-k, saving, arid investment.” Among these pm-o-
posals were reductions in marginal tax rates for’
individuals of 10 per-cent ayear for three years
starting July 1,1981. For corpor-ations, the chief
feature of theproposed tax changes was an accel-
erated recovery rate for the cost of machinery and
equipment and cer-tain str’uctum-es to be phased in
over fiveyears. In general, the effect of the pro-
posed tax changes was to slow the gr-owth offed-
eral receipts by reducing the role of individual
income taxes and corporate income taxes in the
t’evenue structur’e.
Figure 5 shows the Reagan plan fortotal re-
ceipts alongwith actual receipts, both converted
to constant 1982 dollars. Clearly, the trend of real
total receipts slowed aftem’1981 and was much
slower’ than planned. Real receipts plummeted in
1982 and 1983 due both to the r-eduction in tax
rates arid the 1981—82 recession. Since then, f-c-
ceipts have grown faster than in the 1981 Reagan
for-ecast: because they fell so much irI 1982 and
1983, however’, their- 1986 level was still below that
projected by the administration in 1981.
When total receipts are charted relative to GNU
figure 6), the difference between what was
planned in 1981 and what actually happened is
quite pronounced. In an alternative way, this dif-
ference shows the influence of the recession and
how it suppressed federal receipts relative to GNU.
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Figure 4
Total Outlays Relative to Gross National Product
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Total Receipts (constant 1982 dollars)
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THE COMPOSITION OF THE
BUDGET: REALIZATIONS VS. THE
REAGAN PLAN
The 1981 Reagan plan called fbr both a slowing
in the gr-owth of gover’nment outlays and a change
in the composition of spending and receipts. The
change in the composition of outlays was in-
tended to:
shift Federal budget pr-ior-ities so that Federal
resources ate spent for’ purposes that ar-c tr’uly the
responsibility of the national govcr-nment , our-
budget plans reflect the increased importance
attached to national defense, maintain the Federal
Government’s support for the truly needy, arid
firlfill our r’esponsibiliries for interest payments on
the national deht. The spending r’educlions will
restrain Federal involvement in areas that are
properly left to State and local gover’nnien ts or’ to
the private sector.”
The pr’ojected composition oftotal receipts
reflected the two majortax changes: tax relieffor
individuals and greater tax incentives for invest-
mnent by businesses.
Outlays
Table I shows the majom’components ofoutlays
relative to total outlays.” ‘the fir-st column shows
that the Reagan administration planned to in-
crease national defense outlays from 22.9 Uercenit
of total outlays in 1980 to 35.7 percent in 1986.
Although defense outlays did rise, the increase fell
short of the planned level; by 1986, defense outlays
were 27.6 percent of total outlays. Looking at it in a
diffem-ent way, the planned growth ofreal defense
outlays were projected to gr-ow at an 8.6 per-cent
annual rate from 1980 to 1986; their actual rate of
increase was 6.2 per-cent. The actual defense
build-up, while slower than planned, did mark a
reversal of the previous trend.
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The nondefense portion of the budget was re-
duced, but, again, not to the extent that was
planned. The plan called for nondefense outlays
to fall to 64.3 percent of the total by 1986; the ac-
tual proportion was 72.4 percent. Table 1 provides
further detail on nondefense outlays. While the
plan for’payments to individuals, relative to total
outlays, seems close to the mark, the growth rate
comparison shows a different story. Individual
payment outlays rose faster than planned in real
terms; the planned increase was a 1.6 percent
average annual rate from 1980 to 1986 compared
with the actual 2.8 percent rate of increase.
For the category of “all other gr’ants” (the third
column oftable 11, the planned decline was real-
ized in the first two years, but not afterward. Al-
though grants in real terms fell rather dramatically
at a 4.8 percent rate from 1980 to 1986, this was
still less than the 10.7 percent rate of decline
planned by the 1981 administration.
The fourth column of table 1 shows the most
dramatic departure from the 1981 plan. Net inter-
est outlays were forecast to decline sharply; in-
stead, however, they rose sharply. Because this
component of outlays cuts across all factors that
affect the budget and reflects the general intem-ac-
tion of the budget with the economy, this forecast
error serves as a summary measure of the accu-
racy ofboth the budget plan and the economic
forecast.’8 Because outlays grewfaster than
planned while receipts rose more slowly, net in-
terest outlayswere twice as large as planned in
1981. Errors in receipts (overestimated) and out-
lays (underestimated), combined with an underes-
timate of interest m’ates, produced these large
errors.
The final “all other” category of outlays shows a
decline very close to, but generally somewhat less
than planned. /
Receipts
Table 2 shows the components of receipts rela-
tive to the total. Thefirst column, individual in-
come taxes, reflects the ambitious nature of the
1981 taxproposal. The administration proposed a
30 percent reduction in marginal tax rates forindi-
viduals overa three-year period beginning July 1,
1981. Marginal r-ates were to be reduced from an
existing range of 14 percent to 70 percent to a
range of 10 percent to 50 percent by January 1,
1984. This proposal was expected to reduce indi-
vidual income taxes from near 47 percent of total
receipts in 1980 to 43.9 percent in 1983;the per-
centage was thenforecast to rise to 46.7in 1986
because of its expected stimulus to activity via
incentives to work and invest.
The general movement of individual income
taxes relative to the totalwent according to plan;
“See appendix A.
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the timing, however,was substantially different for
several reasons. One of these was the timing ofthe
actual legislation. What’s more, an unanticipated
recession occurred, and the anticipated boom in
economic activity that was expected to follow on
the heels of the tax program failed to develop.
The second column of table 2 summarizes cor-
porate income taxes. Again,the Reagan plan was
broadly realized. Corporate taxes were reduced
andtheir role in the tax system was m-educed, at
least through 1986. The planned and the actual
percentages were quite close in 1986, although the
actualpath ofan’ival from 1981 to 1986 was some-
what different than planned. Corporate income
taxes were severely affected by the 1981—82 reces-
sion, dropping as a percentage of total receipts in
1982—83. Despite the erroneous economicforecast,
however, the general contours ofthe Reagancor-
pom’ate tax plans were realized. This pattern has
been reversed since 1986, however; the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 tightened provisions for accelerated
depi-eciation ofplant and equipment and repealed
the investment tax credit. These results havecan-
celled, to some extent, the effects of the 1981 tax
act.
The evolvingrole of social insurance contribu-
tions in the tax system is shown in the third
column of table 2. The actual ratio followed the
plan very closely through 1982,but moved well
above the forecast after that. This divergence
reflected mainly the 1983 social security amend-
Thefoum’th column of table 2 shows the propor-
tion of excise taxes to total receipts. The 1981
Reagan administration forecast a sharp increase in
1981 and 1982, followed by a steady decline. This
general pattern occurred, except that the peak
was in 1981 and was at a much lower level than
forecast. The discrepancy between what was
planned andwhat actually occurred was mainly
theresult ofmuch smaller than expected gains
from the windfall profits tax;oil price forecasts
were erroneous.
Finally, the ‘all other” category, which is unim-
portant relative to the total, was underestimated.
The major taxes in this category are estate and gift
taxes, customs duties and Federal Reserve de-
posits. The dollar amount of all otherreceipts was
for-eeast accurately;because the total was overesti-
mated (figures 5 and 6), however, “all other” re-
ceipts as a proportion ofthe total was
underestimated.
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF 1981
REAGAN BUDGET PLAN
Table 3 summarizes the 1981 Reagan budget
plan and compares its individual components
with trends prior-to 1981 andwhat actually oc-
cur-red after 1981. Rates of change for budget totals
ments that accelerated collections to keep the
social security program afloat.
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and their majorcomponents are calculated from
the constant dollar measures. A broad judgment is
reached on whether actual performance was con-
sistent with the Reagan plan depending on
whether the actual 1980—88 trend was closer to the
Reagan plan than theprior 1976—80 trend.
The 1980—88 total outlay performance was in-
consistent with the 1981 plan. Although the an-
nual growth rate oftotal real outlays slowed from
a 3.5 percent rate to a 2.9 percent rate, this was
still substantially above the Reagan estimate of 1.1
percent. Total real r’eeeipts, on the other hand,
grew at arate consistent with the 1981 plan; they
actually slowed more than planned because ofthe
1981—82 recession.
An examination ofthe growth of the compo-
nents of real outlays shows that some moved in a
direction consistent with 1981 plan. Real defense
outlays did not rise as much as planned; however,
their’ growth accelerated substantially from the
1976—80 period. Although real nondefense outlays
grewmuch more slowly, the Reagan plan called
for a decline. The components of real nondefense
outlays showed mixed results. Growth in realpay-
ments for individuals and net interest slowed only
slightly. The other two categories, however,
showed a sharp reversal fi’om the prior four years,
although not as much as was planned.
Though r’eal total receipts moved consistently
with the Reagan plan, the components of the total
showed mixed results. Real individual income
taxes rose more slowly than planned, chiefly be-
cause economic growth was overestimated, but
their growth was down sharply from the 1976—80
trend. Real corporate income taxes slowed, but
not to the extent outlined in the 1981 plan. Real
social insurance contributions grew at rates very
close to what was forecast in 1981. Both the excise
and ‘all other” components of total receipts were
estimated incorrectly, but this had little conse-
quence since they are such small pr-oportions of
total receipts.
CONCLUSION
In 1981, the newly inaugurated Reagan adminis-
tration fom’mulated abudget plan designed to slow
the growth ofgovernment and boost incentives
(via taxes) to save< invest and work. Included in the
projeetions was a movement toward abalanced
federal budget by 1986.The actual rise in the fed-
eral deficit since 1981, culminatingwith a $221
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billion deficit in 1986, suggests that the Reagan
budget program failed. Examination ofthe factors
contributing to the deficit as well as the composi-
tion of both outlays and receipts, however, indi-
cates broadly why this result occurred and points
out that theme were a number ofsuccesses as well
as failures when individual components of the
federal budget are considered.
Total receipts in 1986were overestimated by
about $170 billion, mainly because the 1981—82
recession was not anticipated. The major taxpro-
posals were adopted, although not in their exact
form nor according to the proposed timetable.
Because of differences in timing and subsequent
legislation, the actual composition of total receipts
varied somewhat from the 1981 projections. The
direction ofmovement, however, was generally as
projected for individual income taxes, corporate
income taxes and social insurance contributions.
The largest error in the projected composition of
total receipts was for’excise taxes, chiefly because
the forecast of oil prices was in error with the
result that the windfall profits tax did not produce
revenues as expected.
Total outlays were underestimated by about $30
billion in 1986 (or’ more than $70 billion ifthe 1981
estimate includes “unallocated savings”). Further
examination of outlays revealed a $73 billion error
in the projection of net interest. This error was
largely offset, however, because the actual defense
build-up fell about $69 billion below projeetions
by 1986. The noninterest portion of nondefense
spending was underestimated by $15 billion, om’ 5
percent.
In general, ifone looks at budget outlays, the
Reagan pr-ogm-am enjoyed some success: the de-
cline in the relative role of defense outlays was
reversed; payments forindividuals relative to total
outlays continued roughly as planned; all other
grants and the residual category of“all other out-
lays” continued to decline from their peaks in the
late 1970s or 1980. The major exception to the 1981
plan was the rise in net interest outlays produced
by failures to forecast the 1981—82 recession
(which slowed the growth of receipts), the level of
interest rates, andthe cumulative effect on outlays
of compounding interest on agrowing national
debt.”
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Appendix A
The Impact of Economic Assumptions on the 1981
Reagan Budget Plan
Analternative method of evaluating the 1981
budget plan is to simulate the effect on the budget
of economic conditions different fromthose as-
sumed in planning the budget. An updated ver-
sion ofabudget model previously presented in
this Reviewwas used to do this.’ The model con-
sists of three parts: an estimate of the impact of
inflation and real growth on both (1) primary re-
ceipts and (2) primary outlays, and (3) an esti-
mated equation for net interest outlays. The latter
reflects the indirect effects of inflation and real
‘See Carlson (1984), appendix B, for a summary of the model.
The only difference from that model is that the interest cost
equation was reestimated with datathrough 1986. For an ex-
tended discussion of the role of economic assumptions in
budget estimates, see Carlson (1983).
growth on receipts and outlays as well as the ef-
fect of interest rate changes.
First, the 1981 Reagan budget plan was sepa-
rated into primary receipts, primary outlays and
net interest (see table Al). The effects of actual
inflation, real growth and interest rates then were
calculated, yielding simulated values of primary
receipts and outlays and interest cost for the
1981—86 period. These simulation results are
shown in table A2.30
The results indicate that had the 1981 budget
plan been frilly implemented, it would have
yielded a deficit of about $255 billion in 1986.
These results are based on the actual course of
inflation, real growth and interest rates from 1981
to 1986. Since the actual 1986 deficit was $221 bil-
lion (see table A3), apparently the 1981 program
was not implemented as planned. Specifically,
from 1981 to 1986, neither total receipts nor pri-
mary outlays increased to the extent originally
planned; total outlays increased more than
planned because of large errors in estimating net
interest. Thus, the actual behavior of keyeconomic
variables “overexplains” the deficit. That is, ifpri-
mary receipts and outlays had performed accord-
ing to the 1981 plan, the 1986 deficit would have
been much larger than it turned out to be.
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Appendix B
Composition of Federal Outlays
Federal outlays can be classified in terms of two
analytical structures: budget function and major
program category. The functional classification
presents outlays according to the purpose that a
federal program is intended to serve. These func-
tions include, for example, national defense, inter-
national affairs, energy programs, transportation,
health, income security, etc. Two additional cate-
gories — net interest and undistributed offsetting
receipts — do not address specific functions, but
are included to cover the entire budget.
The classification of federal outlays by major
program category focuses on the method of cany-
ing out an activity. The majorprogram categories
are national defense, benefit payments for individ-
uals, grants to state and local governments (other
than for benefit payments), net interest and all
other outlays. National defense and net interest
correspond to the functional categories of the
same name, but the remaining major program
categories do not correspond to a simple sum-
ming of functional categories. Nonetheless, ap-
proximations can be made. The accompanying
table groups 1988 outlays by function to provide
added information about the major’ program cate-
gories discussed in the text.
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